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BID DEPOSITORIES

George H. Schueller*
decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California in the civil antitrust case of
United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc. 1
brought in its wake considerable renewed interest, discussion, and
activities concerning "bid depositories." This is apparent from
the trade press2 and from inquiries reaching the Antitrust Division,
including a number of requests fo:r clearance of bid depository
plans through so-called "railroad release" procedures. Even more
recently, institution of the civil and criminal antitrust cases of
United States v. Arizona Masonry and Plastering Contractors'
Association provided further stimulation.3 The term "renewed"
interest and activities is used because interest and activities in this
field had been vivid from the time of demise of the NRA codes4
until the pre-war years. Perhaps, that interest continued all along,
and only the activities subsided because of the institution, around
1940, of numerous antitrust actions involving bid depositories.IS
Has the Bakersfield decision given a new lease on life to bid
depositories?

T

HE

• Assistant Chief, Trial Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Department of Justice.-Ed.
1 S.D. Cal., Civ. No. 1479-ND, 1958 TRADE CAs. iJ69,087, final judgment by Jertberg, J.,
dated May 26, 1958, modified final judgment by Yankwich, J., dated Dec. 22, 1958, 1959
TRADE CAS. ff69, 266.
2 See Glassie, "The Legal Line," QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR, Oct. 1958, p. 77; Glassie,
"Bidding Plan Cleared," QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR, Dec. 1958, p. 104; Lamb, "Danger Still
Lurks in Bid Depositories," PLUMBING AND HEATING BUSINESS, Feb. 1959, p. 7; "New Optimism vs. New Trouble," PLUMBING AND HEATING BUSINESS, July 1959, p. 77.
3 D.C. Ariz., Crim. No. C-15290, indictment returned June 2, 1959; and D.C. Ariz., Civ.
No. 3066-PHX, complaint filed June 2, 1959. See comment in PLUMBING AND HEATING
BUSINESS, July 1959, p. 7.
4 Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See Joint Hearing Before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 23-24 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 159-160 (1955).
IS See cases cited and discussed infra.
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Before discussing the details of that judgment, it will be well,
first, to describe the commercial problems and issues which lie behind the phenomenon of "bid depositories." We then shall review
the past twenty or so years' experiences with those problems in the
Congress of the United States, in the Antitrust Division, and in the
federal courts. Such a historical background will help in evaluation of the Bakersfield judgment and in reaching conclusions.

I. Bm DEPOSITORIE;,S, Bm SHOPPING, AND Bm PEDDLING
"Bid depository" is not a technical term. There are about as
many types of bid depositories as there are groups creating them.
Basically, it is a facility, created and operated by a trade association
or by an independent agency, such as a bank, which collects bids
for the sale and installation of construction supplies from subcontractors to general contractors. Such bids or copies of bids on
any given job for which bids have been invited are to be sent to
the depository a short time prior to the date set by the general
contractor or awarding authority for the opening and award of the
subcontracts. The depository keeps the subcontractors' bids closed
and confidential until just before or just after the hour of the bid
opening by the general contractor. It then opens and tabulates
those bids, making the bid quotations known to all subcontractors
participating in the depository and, sometimes, to other interested
parties. Once deposited, bids usually may not be withdrawn, or
may be withdrawn only under penalty of certain fines. Administrative costs of the depository are covered by fees collected from
successful bidders. To facilitate compilation of the subcontractors'
bids, special bid forms sometimes are provided.
The principal function of bid depositories is the inhibition of
so-called "bid peddling" and "bid shopping" practices.6 Since
depositories require participating subcontractors to file definitive
subbids prior to the general contractors' opening of those bids,
there is little chance for last-minute haggling. Further, since any
6 In trade circles, those terms are understood to mean offers, requests, and negotiations
for contracts at prices lower than those quoted in bids submitted in response to the original
invitation. If the initiative is taken by the firm which would perform the work, it is called
"bid peddling"; if by the agency or firm for which the work is to be done, it is called "bid
shopping." Of course, it takes both parties to agree on work to be performed at a cut
price. See Report of the Federal Trade Commission, dated May 20, 1952, in S. Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess.,
pp. 274-275 (1952); S. Rep. 617, to accompany S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6 (1955);
H. Rep. 434, to accompany H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957).
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discrepancies between the filed bid quotations of participating subcontractors and the prices ultimately charged by any of them are
likely to be detected, post-award bid shopping among depository
members is also inhibited. And if the general contractor awards
the job to a subcontractor who had not filed a bid with the depository, the unsuccessful subcontractors may infer that he had
used their bids for "shopping" and refrain from competing for his
business in the future. Another function of bid depositories is to
serve as a convenient agency from which general contractors can
obtain a maximum number of subbids.
Bid shopping and bid peddling has long been frowned upon
and marked as an "unethical practice" by some organizations of
interested trades.7 A series of reasons for condemning those practices has been advanced. (a) The preparation of a bid involves
the time and costs necessary to analyze the job, to estimate the
price of required materials and labor, and to calculate the bid
quotation in the light of those factors and of the competitive situation. Parties who engaged in bid peddling or shopping may use
such bid quotations prepared by others for bargaining purposes,
without going to the trouble of preparing their own, independent
calculations. Hence, bid peddling and bid shopping are said to
increase the risk that the contractor who actually prepared a bid
may lose his investment therein. 8 (b) General contractors are interested in obtaining subbids timely enough to prepare their own
bids to the awarding authority on the basis of the best subbid
available. However, in many instances when bid shopping is
feared, general contractors are said to be handicapped in preparing
their bids by delays in the submission of subbids. For "[every subcontractor] holds his bid until the last minute so there will be no
time for [bid] shopping." 9 (c) There is evidence that some subcontractors refrain from submitting bids for jobs on which they
anticipate bid shopping. To that extent, competition among sub7 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF ARCHITECTURAL PRACI"ICE, Bk. III,
p. 702 (1958); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AssoCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, §3.
s Even in the absence of bid shopping, of course, he has no assurance that his bid will
be successful and, in case of subbids, that the general contractor to whom he submits his
bid will be the successful bidder.
9 Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S.
848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 23 (1953). This applies of course only
to bid shopping prior to the final award of the general contract. See also S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,
pp. 81, 90, lll, 112 (1955).
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contractors is diminished.10 ( d) If bid shopping is expected by
the subcontractors, they may pad their bids to allow for reductions
in the course of further negotiations. Hence, it has been said, bid ·
shopping tends to make bids too high.11 (e) After the general
contract has been awarded, the successful general contractor has
strong bargaining powers. Prior to the award the pressure upon
general contractors and subcontractors is about equal, and the
plurality of competing general contractors tends to diffuse their
power over subcontractors. With the general contract in his
pocket, however, the general contractor has something to give to a
subcontractor willing to settle for less than the lowest subbid.12
(f) Situations may arise in which a prime contractor submits his
bid to the awarding authority on the basis of subbids received by
him, obtains the general contract on that basis, then succeeds
through bid shopping or bid peddling in having the subcontractor's work done at a reduced price. Such a price reduction may
create a windfall profit for the prime contractor, instead of a
savings for the awarding authority or owner.13 Those are the
principal arguments adduced by parties interested in condemning
and suppressing bid shopping and bid peddling. However, as it
will be pointed out below, there is another side.
From the records of the Congress14 it is clear that the parties
most strongly interested in creating bid depositories and in eliminating bid peddling are those connected with the mechanical
10 This was the main argument advanced in favor of enactment of a Federal Construction Contract Act. See S. Rep. 448, accompanying S. 848, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 2 (1953);
H. Rep. 892, accompanying H.R. 1825, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1953); S. Rep. 617, accompanying S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1955); H. Rep. 2362, accompanying S. 1644, 84th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 3 (1956); S. Rep. 1119, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 7 (1957); H. Rep. 434, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957).
11 H. Rep. 434, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957). Cf. Ring
Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 at 1075, 1089 (1947).
12 " ••• while bid-shopping prior to the award may be unethical, at that time prime
bidders and the sub-bidders are substantially on the same footing. After the award the
situation is not equal. ..." S. Rep. 617, accompanying S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6
(1955). In the S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 206 (1955), a witness stated: " ... it is not the same economic problem. Before the award of the contract, the subcontractors and the prime
contractors stand on an equal footing in that the prime contractor still needs the subbids.
After the award, the prime contractor has a monopoly, and such a practice is a clear
unfair trade practice, more than a matter of ethics." A witness in the Joint Hearing
Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House
Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 23 (1953), said: " ... after he gets the contract, he can say to
the subcontractors, 'You can do business my way, or we won't do business at all.'"
13 Cf. Ring Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 (1947).
14 All Federal Construction Contract bills, discussed infra, were advocated primarily
by electrical, plumbing, and sheet metal contractors' groups. The Bakersfield case itself,
typically, involved plumbing, sheet metal, and electrical contractors' associations. Cf. also
numerous other antitrust cases involving bid depositories, cited and discussed infra.
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specialty contractors' trade, i.e., electrical, plumbing, and sheet
metal contractors.15 Members of those trades usually participate
in building projects as subcontractors, submitting their bids to
general contractors, although that procedure is by no means universally followed. 16 Members of the non-mechanical specialty contractors' trades, such as masons, bricklayers, floor layers, roofers,
lathers, etc., also function as subcontractors and sometimes create
bid depositories.17 Presumably, all those subcontractor groups
occasionally experience "bid shopping" by general contractors, and
some non-mechanical specialty subcontractors might disagree with
a Senate Report which stated:
"This condition [bid shopping] does not appear to exist to the
same significant degree outside the mechanical specialty contracting field because normally the general contractor does
not find it necessary to procure subbids for work other than
mechanical specialty work.... " 18
There may be, however, a general difference between the mechanical and the non-mechanical groups when it comes to dealing
with general contractors or awarding authorities. It has often
been said that the preparation of bids for mechanical work is more
costly than the preparation of non-mechanical bids and that,
therefore, the awarding of contracts to firms which may not even
have troubled to prepare a bid is more unfair and damaging to
mechanical than to non-mechanical contractors.19
15 S. 1644, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956), §3 (3), contained the following definition: "The
term 'mechanical specialty work' in connection with a construction contract means all
plumbing, heating, piping, air conditioning, refrigerating, ventilating, and electrical work,
including but not limited to the furnishing and installation of sewer, drainage and water
supply piping and plumbing, heating, piping, air conditioning, refrigerating, ventilating
and electrical materials, equipment and fixtures."
16 See "Memorandum on Procedures, etc." submitted on behalf of the National Electrical Contractors' Association and inserted as Appendix to S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 223 (1955).
17 See the Arizona cases, cited note 3 supra, and cases involving tile contractors, marble
contractors, mason contractors, plasterers, cited infra.
18 S. Rep. 617, Federal Construction Contract Act, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. IO (1955).
19 "Estimating with regard to these specialties is an expensive process, requiring highly
trained technicians to estimate the cost of various mechanical specialty work. This expensive process, however, is not the case in calculating and assembling the cost of brickwork,
plastering, excavation, etc., each of which can be figured accurately on a mathematical
basis." [H. Rep. 434, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. IO (1957)]. See also S. Rep. 448, 83d Cong.,
1st sess., p. 6 (1953); H. Rep. 892, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1953); S. Rep. 617, 84th Cong.,
1st sess., p. IO (1955); H. Rep. 2362, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7 (1956); S. Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 74
(1952). But d. H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary
on S. 1644 and Similar House Bills, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 158 (1956); S. Hearings on S.
2907, supra, at p. 278; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the
Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 168 (1953).
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Bid shopping and bid peddling, although condemned as "unethical practices" by the canons of some trade organizations,20 are
nevertheless forms of vigorous price competition and, as such,
supported by national antitrust policies and statutes. Any efforts
to suppress or prevent those practices must come to grips with that
fact. Such efforts have been made, it seems, mainly along the
following approaches, each of which has its limitation: (1)
through persuasion and education among members of interested
groups, including the canons against "unethical practices" referred to above; (2) through statutes requiring either that specialty
work be bid separately and directly to the awarding authorities or
that the prime contractor name the specialty subcontractors on
whose subbids his bid is based and whom he will use; 21 and (3)
through the organization of bid depositories. Education and
ethics, however, vary with the individuals concerned; and penalizing violations un~er a "code of ethics" which restricts price competition may be unlawful. A spokesman for the mechanical
specialty contractors said:
"No sanctions on a violator of a code of ethics are permitted
under our antitrust laws.· The Antitrust Division has been
more than active in every case in which any such effort has
been made, to enforce or even persuade contractors that they
must bid in a certain way.... We would love to cooperate,
but we are not interested in going to jail. ... " 22
As far as statutes are concerned, a few states have enacted legislation requiring prime contractors to specify the names of their subcontractors and the work to be performed by the latter.23 Since
consent of the awarding authority is required for a change in subcontractors, bid shopping and bid peddling is inhibited to some
degree. However, those statutes govern the award of certain types
of public construction contracts only, and they restrict bid shopping and bid peddling only after award of such contracts.24 One
20 See note 7 supra.
21 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering,

1958) §4104; Mass. Laws Ann. (1957; Supp. 1959) c. 149,
§§44A-44D; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1955) tit. 52, §32-2; 55 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940)
§135; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1958 rep!.) §143-128; Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1953) tit. 1, §153.50;
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §1003.
22 Testimony by Mr. Henry H. Glassie at S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 208 (1955).
23 See note 21 supra.
24 They also fail to· restrict bid peddling between subcontractors and their sub-subcontractors, materialmen and suppliers. Cf. S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 113 (1955); H. Hearings
Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339,
H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 117 (1957).
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prominent general contractor, discussing such a statute, publicly
expressed the view that "it has not accomplished a solitary thing." 25
The third approach to restricting bid shopping and peddling,
namely, bid depositories, may appear to be the most effective. They
also are subject to limitations and pitfalls, on which the further
discussions herein are intended to shed some light.

II.

BILLS AGAINST BID SHOPPING IN THE CONGRESS AND
.ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF BID SHOPPING

In the Congress of the United States, the fight against bid shopping and peddling has been connected, for more than twenty
years, with attempts-so far fruitless-to pass a Federal Construction Contract Act or a Federal Construction Contract Procedures
Act.26 While the primary purpose of the various proposed bills
was to improve government construction procedures and to get the
most for the taxpayers' money, the acknowledged secondary purpose was to prevent bid shopping and peddling.27 Discussion of
the provisions of each of the bills in question falls outside the scope
of this paper. Suffice it to say that, among other things, they all
required prime contractors to name in their bids the mechanical
specialty subcontractors to be used on the given job, after the
pattern of the state statutes mentioned above. Those bills were
strongly advocated by representatives of mechanical specialty contractors and opposed by general contractors.28 The federal agencies
most directly concerned with construction also took a negative
attitude toward those bills, mainly for fear of administrative com25 Mr. R. A. Smith, Los Angeles, referring to the California statute in S. Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., p. 176 (1955). The California statute is reprinted at p. 263.
26 For detailed statements of legislative history, see H. Hearings Before Subcommittee
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810,
H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 98, 99, ll6, ll7 (1957); S. Rep. lll9, accompanying
H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2, 3 (1957).
27 See, e.g., the statement by Senator Kilgore, Chairman: "The primary purpose of
the proposed legislation is to effect a procedure under which Federal works may be erected
at the lowest possible cost and under which prime contractors and subcontractors alike
will be protected against the unfair trade practice of bid shopping." S. Hearings Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3
(1955). In S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1952), Senator Sparkman, a sponsor of the bill, stated: "Sec•
tion 3 of the bill is designed to abolish the practice of bid shopping." See also the report of
the Comptroller General, id. at 271.
28 "There has always been a fight by general contractors every time one of these bills
has been submitted." [Senator Kilgore, Chairman, in S. Hearings on S. 1644, cited in note
27 supra, at p. 196] However, in Marcil 1957, the 38th annual convention of the Asso•
ciated General Contractors of America resolved not to object to the principles stated in
five bills then pending in the House, whicll were companions to S. 7168. [S. Rep. lll9,
85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1957)].
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plications, increased expenses, and legal entanglements.29 The
Department of Justice repeatedly took the position that those bills
represented a policy matter for Congress to decide, and that it
preferred to make no recommendation.so
As early as 1932, such bills were introduced in the 72d Congress; there were hearings and a favorable House Report, but no
action.a1 The 75th Congress passed a similar bill in 1938; however, it was vetoed by the President:a2
"While I recognize the evils of 'bid-shopping' and favor any
provision which will promote the prompt payment of the
obligations of contractors for labor and materials, it is believed that this bill will have no tendency to accomplish either
of its objects and will merely create a multitude of administrative difficulties ...."
Of the bills introduced in subsequent Congresses, S. 1644 in the
84th Congress came close to enactment. It passed the Senate but
failed in the House. Again, in the 85th Congress, H.R. 7168
passed the House on voice vote, but the corresponding Senate Bill
S. 2300 failed of passage.as
In various committee hearings on those bills, the pros and cons
of bid shopping and bid peddling were discussed. The principal
evils attributed to such practices have been described above.
There follow some of the factual contentions on the other side. (a)
29 See, e.g., S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952), containing adverse recommendations from the Departments of Defense, Interior, General Services Administration, Atomic Energy Commission,
and the Comptroller General; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees
on the Judiciary on S. 848, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), containing adverse recommendations from the Secretary of the Army, General Services Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and General Accounting Office; S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), containing adverse recommendations from the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and General
Services Administration; H. Hearings Before a Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on
the Judiciary on S. 1644, H.R. 7637, H.R. 7638, H.R. 7668, H.R. 7676, H.R. 7686, H.R.
7693, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1955), containing adverse recommendations from General Services Administration, Comptroller General, Atomic Energy Commission, Departments of
the Army and of the Interior; H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, H.R. 4313, 85th Cong.,
1st sess. (1957), containing negative recommendations from the Departments of the Army
and of the Interior, General Services Administration, and Atomic Energy Commission.
30 See Deputy Attorney General Rogers' letter to the Chairman, dated May 15, 1957, in
H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241,
etc., 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 95 (1957); and letters from the Department of Justice contained in other Hearings, cited in note 29 supra.
31 H.R. 4680, H.R. 9921; S. 4081, S. 1639. H. Rep. 1272 on H.R. 9921, 72d Cong., 1st
sess. (1933).
32 H.R. 146. Veto message of June 25, 1938, contained in 83 CONG. REc. 9707-9708
(1938).
33See S. Rep. 1119, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (1957).
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Subbids frequently are not precise or not responsive to the specifications; therefore, further negotiations between prime and subcontractors are necessary for clarification.34 (b) In preparing
their bids under time pressure, prime contractors often are unable
to check a subcontractor's reputation, previous experience, and
credit standing, causing rejections of subbids which, upon subsequent inquiry, may prove to be quite acceptable.35 (c) Awarding authorities often invite bids on alternates, and since different
subbids may be low on different alternates, negotiations between
prime contractor and subcontractors are necessary after determination of the specific alternate to be used. 36 (d) The average costs
of estimating specialty work may not be as significant as contended and they represent a normal part of the costs of competing
in that type of business.37 (e) Prime contractors cannot rely on
"first-round" subbids, which generally are too high; therefore,
general contractors must prepare their bids according to their
own estimates of the cost of specialty work and negotiate subcontracts for such ·work later.38 (f) Negotiations between prime and
subcontractors prior to formulation of the prime bids tend to
lower construction costs to the awarding authority or owner. 39
34 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 150, 164 (1952); Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of
the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess.,
pp. 110, 144-145 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 152 (1955); H. Hearings Before Subcommittee
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810,
H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 145 (1957).
35 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 159, 173 (1955); Joint Hearing on S. 848 and Similar House
Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 166-167 (1953).
36 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 136-137, 196 (1952); Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees
of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 144-145 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 151 (1955); H. Hearings Before Subcommittee
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644 and Similar House Bills, 84th Cong.,
2d sess., pp. 208-209 (1956).
37 See Report of the Federal Trade Commission in S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 274-275 (1952); id.,
pp. 137, 141; id., p. 151; Joint Hearing Before the Suboommittees of the Committees on
the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 146 (1953); H.
Hearings Before Suboommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644 and
Similar House Bills, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 210 (1956).
38 See Report of the Federal Trade Commission, note 37 supra; Report of the Acting
Comptroller General, id., p. 272; id., p. 151; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of
the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess.,
pp. 153-154, 168 (1953).
39 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 112, 172; Report of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
in H. Rep. 2362, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 19 (1956).
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We cannot assume that the qualified witnesses who propounded
the arguments on one side of the "bid shopping and bid peddling"
controversy are entirely right, and that those who propounded the
arguments on the other side are entirely wrong. Therefore, their
seemingly conflicting contentions, mentioned above, must he reconciled on the basis that such practices sometimes may be necessary and beneficial, while sometimes they may be, and in certain
instances actually have been, unfair, detrimental, or both,40 all
depending upon the particular circumstances of a given situation.

Ill.

ANTITRUST DIVISION ACTIONS INVOLVING BID DEPOSITORIES

Antitrust law enforcement cannot be shaped in vacuo. Before
prosecuting any antitrust case, the Department of Justice considers
the particular attending circumstances and the equities, in addition
to the law involved. When it comes to cases concerning bid depositories, the equities of bid shopping and. bid peddling are
pertinent but, as we have seen, their weight may fall on either side
of the scales. Also pertinent, however, are other practices and
activities which frequently surround bid depositories and which
fall rather on the dark side of the bid depository picture. They
include practices or agreements of price fixing, bid rigging, allocating markets or customers, and of boycotting or otherwise conspiring against or with competitors, suppliers, customers or labor
groups in restraint of trade. The records show that in the past
twenty years at least twenty-eight bid depository situations41 were
prosecuted by the Department of Justice, civilly, criminally, or
both.42 It appears from the table below that all those cases, at least
according to the pleadings, showed some feature or features well
recognized as unreasonable restraints of trade, not merely the existence of a bid depository.

A.

Restraints on Free Price Competition

According to the pleadings, all but two cases explicitly showed
elements of price fixing or other price interference. In the majority of those cases, such elements were embedded among the terms
of the alleged conspiracy; 43 in other cases they were alleged as
Cf. Ring Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 (194-7).
cases listed in the table below. [Note: "Blue Book" citations herein refer to
CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, WITH SUMMARY OF CAsES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED
STATES. Cases will be cited: "Blue Book No. - - · " ]
42 I.e., counting companion civil and criminal cases as one situation.
43 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 468, 470, 473, 477, 486, 492, 493, 499, 506, 507, 508, 537, 543'.
919, 1070, 1149, 1449.
40

41 See
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effects of the plan.44 One of the two exceptions (Blue Book No.
545) involved a conspiracy to monopolize and a monopolization
of the market, hence implicitly also impediments to free price
competition. The other exception was the Bakersfield case, discussed below. It follows that bid depository antitrust cases, typically, involved some combination, conspiracy, or agreement in
restraint of free price competition, with the depository serving as
an ancillary device. Since any concerted tampering with the price
structure is per se illegal under the Sherman Act, 45 such schemes
represented an offense regardless of whether the participants flatly
agreed on a fixed price,46 adopted a predetermined formula designed to result in uniform prices,47 left the decision of who should
be the "low bidder" to an appointed agent,48 permitted the bid
depository to eliminate the lowest bids,49 agreed to exchange bids
in advance for purposes of price comparisons,''° appointed a common estimator,''1 or used any other procedure directly interfering
with independent, competitive pricing.

B.

Coercion or Boycott

Again with the possible exception of two situations, all bid
depository cases listed on the table showed elements of coercion or
boycott against competitors of the parties interested in the depository plan. Firms engaged in the same business as those interested
in the plan either were bound to use the depository or else they
were excluded by group action from at least part of the market.
In other words, those depositories were either compulsory5 2 or
exclusionary.53 In either type of case, the freedom of competitive
action of independent businessmen allegedly was restricted. Since
group actions to exclude others from a market ("boycotts") are
per se illegal under the Sherman Act,5 4 exclusionary bid depositories are offensive, even if they provide for no other restrictions.
As an illustration, consider the case listed under Blue Book No.
545. As previously mentioned, it did not directly involve price44 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 479, 500, 501, 504, 518, 533, 1027.
45 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 at 223 (1940).
46 See cases listed in the table under Blue Book Nos. 473, 492, 499, 506.
47 See Blue Book Nos. 477, 507, 1449.
48 See Blue Book No. 506.
49 See Blue Book Nos. 476, 477, and 500.
50 See Blue Book Nos. 470, 501, and 1149.
51 See Blue Book Nos. 470, 504, and 1070.
52 Blue Book Nos. 476, 477, 478, 479, 499, 500, 501, 504, 919, 1027, 1070, 1149, 1242.
53 Blue Book Nos. 468, 473, 486, 492, 493, 506, 507, 508, 518, 533, 543, 545, 1449.

54Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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fixing. However, pursuant to the plan, tile contractors who were
not members of the defendant association were deprived of labor
by the union, of supplies by the manufacturers, and of business
orders by the general contractors. A more clear-cut case of illegal
boycott by multiple groups it is hard to imagine.
The same legal principles apply even if only one group, the
members of the depository without help from manufacturers,
labor unions or others, collectively coerce or boycott contractors.65
Therefore, depositories must be condemned which impose fines or
other penalties upon non-conforming contractors.66 For example,
the case in Blue Book No. 500 shows, among other things, that
depository members were prohibited, under penalties, from submitting lower bids on a project after the depository had sifted their
bids submitted to it. The agreement not to submit subsequent,
reduced bids was of dubious legality under the Sherman Act; the
group sanction to enforce it made it more so.
The two cases which showed no coercion on competitors, referred to above, involved devices to share the market, in .one instance through a "joint venture arrangement,"67 in the other instance through predetermined quotas. 68 Inasmuch as those arrangements may have been considered by the participants to be binding,
they were in a sense compulsory, although not strictly speaking
coercive. So viewed, every depository situation listed in the table
showed that specialty contractors were compelled to abide by depository regulations, or that non-participating competitors were
discriminated against, or that both those things were done. 69
Numerous depository cases listed in the table show measures
of coercion or boycott also against manufacturers, jobbers, general
contractors, or labor. Thus, we find a number of cases in which
the depository group would collectively threaten to withhold its
patronage from suppliers who sell directly to general contractors,60
to non-member specialty contractors,61 or to member specialty contractors who failed to obey depository rules. 62 In one case, mem65 United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp.
915, affd. 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
66 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 473, 493, 499, 500, 506.
67 Blue Book No. 470.
68 Blue Book No. 537. Coercion was applied upon general contractors to enforce the
plan.
59 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 486, 492, 919, 1242, 1449.
60 Blue Book No. 468.
61 Blue Book Nos. 486, 493, 499, 506, 518, 533, 545.
62 Blue Book No. 1149.
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hers of the depository group forced manufacturers to sell materials
directly to them and to by-pass jobbers; 63 and in another case they
agreed to boycott suppliers selling products at prices not agreeable
to them. 64 As with suppliers, so with customers. In a number of
cases the depository group apparently considered itself to be powerful enough to demand that general contractors, owners, and awarding authorities do business with members of the group, to the
exclusion of non-members and violators of the depository rules. 65
In most but not all of those instances, the leverage over customers
stemmed from support by labor groups, about which more later.
However achieved, such concerted pressures upon customers may
constitute not only a conspiracy in violation of section I of the
Sherman Act, but also a conspiracy or attempt to monopolize or
monopolization in violation of section 2 of the act.
The cases of coercion or boycott by depositories against labor
are few, 66 since successful coercion may align labor groups with
depositories on the side of co-defendants or co-conspirators, making
the situation one of "participation by labor groups."67 The two
cases of coercion against labor listed in the table, however, illustrate
both illicit purposes for which such coercion might be used. In
the case Blue Book No. 499, laborers working for non-members of
the depository organization, a chapter of NECA, were boycotted to
force non-member electrical' subcontractors into the organization.
And in the Arizona Consolidated case (Blue Book No. 1449), defendants allegedly agreed to blacklist and boycott masons and
plasterers working for general contractors who do not accept bids
exclusively from members of the defendant association.

C.

Allocation of Markets or Customers

If subcontractors have reached a foregone conclusion as to who
is to serve certain markets or specific customers, competitive bidding becomes a fraud and a sham. An agreement or conspiracy
to that effect is likely to constitute a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, since it affects the bid price and excludes all but one firm
63 Blue
64 Blue

Book No. 543.
Book No. 1070. This is an instance of "primary" rather than "secondary"

boycott.
65 Blue :Book Nos. 468, 486, 492, 499, 506, 508, 537, 543, 545, 919, 1027, 1242, 1449.
66 :Blue :Book Nos. 499 and 1449.
67 See cases cited in note 71 infra. :Blue Book No. 499 distinctly showed both boycott
of certain laborers and cooperation by a labor union. As we know, the interests of the
individuals and those of their organization do not always fully coincide.
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from that particular business.68 Bid rotation, quota allotments,
fictitious bids, complimentary bids, and other devices might
camouflage such arrangements, but if discovered they add to the
evidence of intent and consciousness of guilt. Such proved to be
the case in United States v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Association/9 one of the few fully litigated bid depository cases on the
record. The indictment in that case contained allegations of a
whole series of restrictions, but the convictions were upheld by the
circuit court of appeals-as far as the sufficiency of the evidence
was concerned-mainly because the record showed customer allocation, camouflaged by fictitious and complimentary bids, and price:fixing.10

D. Participation by Other Groups in Conspiracy in
Restraint of Trade
As the table below shows, very few of the bid depositories
attacked by .the Antitrust Division for coercion or boycott relied
on the strength of their members alone. In most cases, participation by labor groups,71 suppliers,72 or customers78 was alleged. In
contrast with the various restrictions previously discussed, agreements between specialty contractors or their associations and labor
or other groups are not necessarily illegal in themselves. Trade
associations, for instance, often negotiate on behalf of their members collective bargaining agreements with labor unions, which
may be perfectly legal for them to do. Trade associations may
legally enter also into purchase contracts with suppliers on behalf
of their members, or they may negotiate with awarding authorities
and other customers about standards and specifications of equipment to be supplied by members. However, the agreements and
68 One of the leading decisions holding market allocations to be per se illegal under
the Sherman Act is United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). Concerning
customer allocation, cf. United States v. American Linen Supply Co., (N.D. Ill. 1956) 141
F. Supp. 105 at 114.
69 (9th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 732, cert. den. 348 U.S. 817 (1954). Cf. United States v.
New England Concrete Pipe Corp., D.C. Mass., Civ. No. 57-631-A, Crim. No. 57-156-A, Blue
Book Nos. 1343 and 1349.
70 For other cases involving allocation, see Blue Book Nos. 493, 506, 508, 537, 1070,
1149, 545. The case last cited charged attempted monopolization of the Detroit tile market,
i.e., an allocation of that market by the defendant association to itself and its members.
71 Blue Book Nos. 468, 473, 475, 477, 478, 479, 485, 492, 499, 500, 501, 504, 507, 508,
518, 533, 543, 545, 1070.
72 Blue Book Nos. 545, 919, 1149.
78 Blue Book Nos. 493, 1242.

1960]

BID

DEPOSITORIES

511

collaboration with which we are concerned here are those that
help tighten the rules or practices of bid depositories. It is difficult
to imagine an agreement or joining of forces between a bid depository and representatives of labor, customers, or suppliers that
would not serve some restrictive purposes or effects. Therefore,
such alignments with other groups are most likely to make bid
depositories vulnerable to antitrust attacks.
It appears that the most frequent of those alignments are with
labor unions or their representatives. Such combinations are
risky not only for the depository members but also for the unions.
In a number of our depository cases, unions or union representatives have been named as defendants.74 The statutory exemptions
from the antitrust laws for labor do not shield labor officials who
engage in deals with depositories to help enforce anticompetitive
restrictions. It was so held in the Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers
case, above. For the Supreme Court of the United States in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,7 5 decided that if unions combine
with non-labor groups and "aid and abet businessmen to do the
precise things which that [Sherman Antitrust] Act prohibits," they
are liable under that act. It is, therefore, reprehensive for a
depository group to persuade a union to withdraw laborers from
contractors failing to obey the depository rules. 76 But even more
stringently anticompetitive union arrangements have come to the
attention of the Antitrust Division. For instance, it was alleged
in United States v. Employer Plasterers' Association of Allegheny
County (Blue Book No. 507):
"The defendant labor unions entered into agreements with
the defendant association . . . which . . . provided that union
labor would be supplied solely to members of the association,
notwithstanding the fact that numerous ... contractors who
were not members of the association were willing to agree to
all requirements of the defendant labor unions .... "
"The defendant association . . . with the knowledge, consent, and support of the defendant labor unions, arbitrarily
excluded from membership certain ... contractors who had
sought membership in the association, with the result that
74E.g., Blue Book Nos. 468, 476, 486, 492, 499, 504, 507, 508, 533, 543, 545, 1070.
325 U.S. 797 at 801 (1945). Cf. United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn. of
Chicago, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
76 E.g., in Blue Book No. 476, depository members who had complied with the rules
were issued a "certificate of fair competition," which had to be displayed on the job site.
Those contractors who failed to obtain such a certificate were to be deprived of union labor.
75
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such excluded contractors were unable to employ union labor
necessary for participation in all building programs ... where
union labor was specified."77
Yet another purpose of depositories combining with labor groups
may be to prevent general contractors from engaging in bid shopping and bid peddling. Thus, Blue Book Nos. 500 and 501 show
cases in which union labor allegedly was to be withheld from any
subcontractor attempting to do a job on which he had not submitted the low bid through the depository. No matter how unethical the subcontractors may consider bid shopping practices to
be, they cannot lawfully prevent such practices by thus combining
and conspiring with labor groups. For even if it be assumed that
the subcontractors may have a legitimate grievance against bid
shoppers, laborers do not, as long as proper wages and working
conditions are offered.78
Only brief comment is required on depository situations which
involve suppliers as participants. Materials and equipment obviously are essential to subcontractors' work. In all such situations
listed in the table, manufacturers or jobbers were persuaded or
coerced by the subcontractor groups to refuse their products to
subcontractors not conforming with the rules and regulations of
the groups. Such agreements and combinations, of course, are outright commercial boycotts and per se illegal under the Sherman
Act.79
There remain the instances of participation by customers.
Conspiring to coerce general contractors and owners into acceptance of bid depository rules is one thing, but to obtain their active
cooperation would seem to require extraordinary persuasion. Although, as previously mentioned, participation by customers was
alleged in two cases, the fact that no customers were named as defendants may indicate that their participation did not appear to
be very strong.80
IV.

SEITLED AND UNSETI'LED PROBLEMS CONCERNING

BID

DEPOSITORIES

Since the middle fifties, the principle has been established that
specialty contractors' depository arrangements may involve interstate coIIJ.merce and thus be subject to federal regulation under the
77 Comparable, but not involving a bid depository as such, was Local No. 175 v. United
States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431.
78 Cf. United States v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Assn., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
79 See authorities cited in note 54 supra.
so See the pertinent terms of conspiracy alleged in Blue Book Nos. 1027 and 1449.
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Sherman Act. 81 The Government, of course, has the burden of
proving the factual elements of interstate commerce. Previous
misapprehensions about the applicability of the Sherman Act may
account for the creation of some of the earlier depository schemes
which, once it has been established that the Sherman Act applies,
appear to be in glaring violation of that act. 82 Our table, however,
shows also quite recent cases involving restrictions of the types
which are clearly illegal. Some offenders apparently refuse to
learn or to be deterred. That, however, is only part of the bid
depository picture as it appears today. As indicated at the beginning of this article, there exist also honest differences of opinion
and doubts about some aspects of bid depositories, particularly on
the basis of the Bakersfield judgment. Those doubts can hardly
concern the grosser types of restrictive arrangements, such as pricefixing, bid rotation, boycotts of non-members, collusion with labor
groups, etc. Rather, those doubts revolve around the questions
of whether depositories in the absence of such flagrant abuses may
be legal, and if so, under what conditions. Although Bakersfield,
so far, is the only litigated judgment in a civil antitrust case involving bid depositories, it is not the only source to be considered in
answering the question of whether there may be innocuous bid
depositories. The general position of the Antitrust Division regarding depositories and pertinent principles developed in other
court opinions, are not eclipsed by one trial court's opinion on one
specific depository.

A.

The Position and Policy of the Antitrust Division in the Past

Of the numerous consent decrees referred to in the table, below, the greater number prohibit continuation of depository
activities through injunctions which are qualified as to the purposes
or effects of such depositories.83 For example, the consent decree
in United States v. Employing Plasterers' Association of Allegheny
County (Blue Book No. 507) enjoined defendants from:
81 United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United
States v. Employing Lathers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 198 (1954); Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Assn. v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 732, cert. den. 348 U.S. 817
(1954); United States v. Northeastern Texas Chapter, NECA, (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d)
30 at 33-34; Local 175 v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431.
82 In 1954, the unsuccessful argument was made, perhaps bona fide, in a case comparable to a bid depository case that " .•• the indictment did not charge a violation of
the Sherman Act, but constituted merely a charge of local restraint and monopoly not
reached by the Act." Local 175 v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431 at 433.

w~~~•~m~m~~~m~••~~
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"(a) Creating, operating or participating in the operation of
any association of ... contractors maintaining a bid depository
or any similar plan or device designed to maintain or to fix the
price of plaster ... or to limit competition in bidding ... or
having the effect of limiting the awarding authority in the free
choice of plastering or lathing contractors."84
Again, the decree in United States v. Heating, Piping and Air Conditioning Contractors Association of Southern California (Blue
Book No. 628) enjoined defendants from "creating, operating, or
participating in the operation of any association or other group ...
maintaining a bid depository .... , or similar device, designed to or
having the effect of, arbitrarily fixing or stabilizing the prices ...." 85
While, as a practical matter, it may be difficult or risky for defendants to operate any depository in the teeth of such injunctive
provisions, in legal analysis those injunctions stop short of prohibiting depositories, absolutely. Hence, those decrees seem to indicate
that some form of bid depository might be devised which is innocuous under the antitrust laws.
True, in a minority of cases, bid depositories have been prohibited in absolute terms. 86 We find, for instance, in United
States v. Santa Barbara County, NECA (Blue Book No. 630), that
defendants were enjoined from, among other things, "creating,
operating, or participating in the operation of any association ...
maintaining a bid depository or similar common agency for the
deposit of bids, or similar device." Even more flatly, defendants in
United States v. Tile Contractors Association of America, Inc.
(Blue Book No. 533) were not permitted "to create, operate or
participate in the operation of any bid depository." 87
Those decrees with absolute prohibitions against depositories
do not, it is submitted, disprove the conclusion in the foregoing
paragraph. Certainly, in view of the overlapping dates of the
consent decrees with absolute and of those with qualified injunctions, it cannot be inferred from them that the Antitrust Division
at some time changed its policy and position. The argument could
84

CCH 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 1]56,025, at p. 79. Emphasis supplied.

85 Id., 1]56,146, at p. 570. Emphasis supplied.
86 Blue Book Nos. 533, 543, 545, 567, 604, 630,

679, II53.
Blue Book Nos. 543, 545, 604, and ll53. In some instances, the distinction
between absolute and qualified injunctions against depositories depends on very subtle
differences in language. For instance, compare the wording in Heating, Piping & Air
Conditioning Contractors Assn., quoted in the text supra, with United States v. Southern
Cal. Marble Association (Blue Book No. 567) containing the unqualified prohibition
against "operating or participating in the operation of any bid depository or of any scheme
••. designed to maintain or fix ••• price[s]."
87 Similar:
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be made that absolute interdiction reflects the true view of the
division, and that qualifications were written into some decrees as
a result only of the particular defendants' negotiating skills or
bargaining position. Although it is true that consent decrees are
bargained compromises, the decrees with merely qualified prohibitions are so numerous that they cannot all be ascribed to deficiencies in the Government's cases or bargaining techniques. The
natural explanation for the two divergent types of prohibitions is
that different situations show different degrees of (1) risk to competition connected with the continuation of any bid depository,
and (2) need to dissipate the effects of past wrongdoing. The
more reprehensible the restraints practiced by defendants were in
the past, and the more effective they were in strangling competition,
the more stringent have to be the injunctions. In some cases it
may well have appeared too risky to permit continuing operation
of any depository by the defendants.
Other factors corroborate the view that the Antitrust Division
never pursued a policy of condemning all bid depositories "per se."
Thus, the consent decree in United States v. Reno Merchant
Plumbing and Heating Contractors, Inc. (Blue Book No. 1027),
in section V (A), recognized bid depositories, in principle, by enjoining defendants from "submitting copies of duplicate bids or
otherwise disclosing such bids to any person except a bid depository
(emphasis supplied)," although the decree in section VI prohibits, of course, all typical kinds of compulsory, exclusionary, or otherwise anticompetitive depository rules.88 Furthermore, a flexible
attitude toward depositories would be in keeping with the department's attitude toward the various Federal Construction Contract
bills in past Congresses.89 Since the department in reviewing those
bills apparently felt that lawful means to inhibit bid shopping and
bid peddling would not run counter to antitrust policies, bid depositories might be acceptable, if they were designed only to discourage bid shopping and free from restrictive rules and nefarious
collateral activities. Finally, consistent with such thinking, the
Antitrust Division recently granted "railroad releases" on at least
two bid depository plans. The contents of those plans and the
parties involved have not been published, but it is known that both
those plans rely essentially upon publicity concerning the comss Such prohibited depository rules include: compulsory filing of bids with a depository prior to their submission to awarding authorities; restrictions as to time and place
at which all bids must be filed; restrictions against bidding after bid opening; restrictions
against revising bids after opening; imposition of penalties; etc.
so See text at note 30 supra.
·
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peting subbids, and that they are free from any compulsory or
exclusionary features. The fact that experienced businessmen
and counsel worked out those plans would indicate that depository
regulations need have no "teeth" and yet may afford some help
against bid shopping.
B.

Court Opinions Prior to Bakersfield

In the criminal antitrust case of United States v. Northeast
Texas Chapter, NECA, (Blue Book No. 919), paragraph 27 (c) of
the second count of the indictment charged as a separate term of
the alleged conspiracy that defendants established a "Bid Registration System" under which each contractor would report his intent
to submit a bid on any particular job, under penalty of a $1,000 fine
for failure to do so. In its brief on appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
filed July I, 1949, p. 21, the Government argued that paragraph
27 (c) amounted to a charge of price-fixing violations, which "are
per se a violation of the Sherman ~ct." Note, however, that in
this case, which was appealed on the pleadings, a price stabilizing
intent and function of the depository had been alleged, and that
the depository had been alleged to be compulsory under heavy
penalties. Moreover, the "Bid Registration System" was incriminated in the indictment at the very end of a lengthy list of palpably
nefarious agreements, which that System allegedly "implemented."
Thus, it can hardly be said that this indictment represented an attack upon depositories, as such. The Fifth Circuit, discussing the
illegality of the various agreements charged, concluded:
"Under the circumstances alleged, the price fixing agreements and the illegal inclusion of profits not related to the
usual trade, are illegal. Likewise may be the boycott of those
who will not operate in accordance with the plan.... Agreement upon prices and terms for the sale of lighting fixtures
may likewise be shown to be illegal. In the very nature of the
trade and commerce alleged, these agreements, some per se,
and others as a matter of fact, constitute an illegal restraint....
What has just been said as to the agreements charged in the first
count, is likewise applicable to those charged in the second
and is based upon principles already well established in such
cases."00
Although these legal conclusions are not as clear as they could be,
it appears that the court emphasized the price-fixing and boycott
eo 181 F. {2d) 30 at 33 (1950).
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features, 91 which it considered as illegal per se, and probably
deemed the registration scheme to be illegal only "as a matter of
fact," i.e., under all the circumstances of the case. The opinion
as a whole, however, reflects a skeptical attitude toward bid depositories. One may doubt whether any restrictive features in a
depository arrangement would be acceptable to that court, even if
prevention of bid peddling were advanced as the purpose of that
arrangement.
There are some Supreme Court opinions which contain principles which may serve as a guide in determining acceptable and
unacceptable characteristics of depositories. Thus, a depository
arrangement which is compulsory upon members probably violates
a principle announced in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States. 02 The case involved an "auction pool," a bid depository
of sorts, by which a group of pipe manufacturers determined who
should submit the low bid in any given instance. The Court said:
"Total suppression of the trade in the commodity is not
necessary in order to render the combination one in restraint
of trade. It is the effect of the combination in limiting and
restricting the right of each of the members to transact business in the ordinary way ... that is regarded. All the facts and
circumstances are, however, to be q:msidered."03
The same principle of "freedom of trade" for the individual to
conduct business in his own chosen way was emphasized in
Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States. 04 The
principle that price information concerning prospective contracts
should not be exchanged among trade members, but that the
exchange of statistics on past transactions may be innocuous if
given wide publicity, was developed in American Column Co.
v. United States,05 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.96
and Maple Flooring Association v. United States. 91 Applied to
a bid depository situation, this principle requires that information about the participants' bids should be tabulated and disclosed only after expiration of the time for submission of the
91 Cf. the similar approach of the Ninth Circuit in its Las Vegas opinion, mentioned
in the text at note 69 supra.
92 175 U.S. 2ll (1899).
93 Id. at 244. Emphasis added.
9 4 282 U.S. 30 at 42 (1930). Cf. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207
(1959).
95 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
96 262 U .s. 371 (1923).
01268 U.S. 563 (1925).
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bids to the awarding authority, and that it then should be made
available to all persons interested. A further principle which
should be observed in evaluating bid depository rules underlies
the decision in Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC. 98 That case
stands for the proposition that a scheme intended to prevent an
unethical practice, namely, "fashion piracy," will nevertheless be
vitiated if it violates the antitrust laws. Therefore, depositories
designed to prevent the "unethical practices" of bid shopping and
bid peddling are nevertheless illegal, if they are unduly restrictive.
Although the Rule of Reason permits restrictions that are "ancillary" to a legitimate principal transaction,99 it will not do to regiment an industry through depository rules,1° 0 espetially if those
rules are peremptory and bristle with policing and penalty provisions.101 Since not all contract negotiations after bidding are
unethical, depository rules to promote ethical and inhibit unethical practices ought to be as subtle as their aim.102 It is submitted
that all those principles are observed best by depositories which
rely merely upon post-award publicity on bid data, like those on
which the above referred to "railroad releases" were granted.
V.

THE BAKERSFIELD CASE103

As in all previous antitrust cases involving bid depositories, the
Government pleaded a combination and conspiracy which was
broader than the mere formation of the depository and the adoption
of its rules. The last four subparagraphs of paragraph 13 of the
complaint charged (1) compulsion of members and of others to
use the depository, (2) compulsion of members to boycott general
contractors who fail to deal exclusively through the depository, (3)
compulsion of general contractors to deal exclusively with the
depository, and (4) exclusion of outsiders from sales and installation of plumbing supplies. Accordingly, the Government denied
a request by defendants to admit that the alleged conspiracy con98 (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 80, affd. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
99 See United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (6th

Cir. 1898) 85 F. 271 at 280,
282, 283, affd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
100 Cf. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 at 238, 240 (1899).
Even at common law, ancillary restrictions are permissible only if they are consonant with
the interests of the parties and of the public. Attorney General v. The Adelaide Steamship
Co., [1913] A.C. 781 at 794.
101 Cf. United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter, NECA, (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 30.
The Government specifically attacked such agreements, among other things, in the cases
listed under Blue Book Nos. 468 and 504.
102 If "unethical dealing" reaches proportions of an unfair trade practice, regulation
by the Federal Trade Commission may be invoked.
10a See citation in note 1 supra.
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sisted merely of the agreement on the depository's rules. The first
two subparagraphs of paragraph 13, however, alleged squarely the
formation of the depository and the adoption and enforcement of
its rules, which were attached to the pleading. As the proceedings
unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the restrictive depository rules were the gist of the complaint. They were extensively discussed in the Government's pre-trial memorandum and
post-trial brief, characterizing some of them as illegal per se.
Perhaps more than in any previous antitrust case, the depository
itself was at trial.104
In the post-trial brief the Government specifically argued also
against those rules which most directly concerned bid peddling,
namely, (a) a rule against submission of further bids to the general
contractor within 120 days after the first bid opening, (b) a rule
requiring the subcontractors to name their intended sub-subcontractors in their bids, and (c) a rule making acceptance of the
lowest depository bid binding on the general contractors.
As to the alleged coercion and boycott, the Government named
three subcontractors and one general contractor alleged to have
been affected. Only two subcontractors and one general contractor testified to the effect that they had been excluded from some
business for failure to join the depository.
In its Findings of Fact, the court found (with certain exceptions
not applicable here): "[T]here is no evidence that: ... (c) any
manufacturer or supplier ... has been coerced or intimidated ... ;
(e) any general contractor or subcontractor has been threatened
or intimidated, or in any way coerced. . . ." 105 The court also
found: ". . . The defendants established the bid depository primarily to eliminate bid peddling...." 106
In other words, the Government failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court (1) any ill intent and (2) any restraints, especially coercion or boycott, beyond those inherent in the depository
rules.107 As to the latter, the court concluded, as a matter of law:
"The adoption and enforcement of the bid depository rules
other than rules 6, 8 and 12B, do not constitute a boycott, nor
do they singly or collectively constitute any unreasonable re104 "The main thrust of the Government is against the establishment and operation by
the defendants of the bid depository in accordance with [its] rules." Finding of Fact No. 23.
105 Finding No. 55.
106 Finding No. 54.
107 With respect to both intent and extraneous restraints the Bakersfield situation
thus assumed a complexion radically different from the Las Vegas and Northeast Texas
Chapter situations, discussed supra. A detailed comparison of those opinions, therefore,
is impracticable.
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straint of trade, nor are they per se violations of the Sherman
Act."1os

In his Order of December 31, 1957, Judge Jertberg had explained
why he considered rules 6, 8 and 12B to be price-fixing and illegal
per se. He went on to say (p. 8): "The remaining rules are reasonable and were designed to correct evils which exi~ted in the
Bakersfield trade area prior to the establishment of the bid depository." Thus, the Government was entitled to relief only with
respect to the bid depository rules 6, 8 and 12B, which provided,
respectively, (I) that separate bids must be submitted for plumbing and for heating and ventilating, and combination bids must
not be lower by more than five percent than the separate bids
added together; (2) that successful bidders shall pay depository
fees of one percent on each of the contracts for plumbing, for
heating and ventilating, for sheet metal, and for electrical work,
up to a maximum of $1,000 on each such contract; and (3) that between the time of opening and the time when bids are made
available to general contractors, the bids may be withdrawn upon
payment of one percent of the quoted price, up to a maximum of
$1,000.
Judge Jertberg's judgment of May 26, 1958, enjoined the defendants from continuing, reviving, or renewing "the aforesaid
combination and conspiracy,"109 and from adopting, enforcing, or
continuing in effect any of the provisions of rule 6, rule 8, or
rule 12b, or any rule which (1) requires submission of separate
bids for plumbing or separate bids for heating and ventilating; (2)
limits the price at which a combination bid may be submitted; (3)
requires that the successful bidder through the depository shall
pay any fee; and (4) permits withdrawal of any bid between bid
opening and delivery of bids to any gen~ral contractor.
Against the background of general principles and precedents
discussed hereinabove, it appears that Judge Jertberg's approach
bears some resemblance to that of Chief Justice Stone in Maple
Flooring Association v. United States. Failing, like Chief Justice
Stone, to find any restraints or abuses outside the depository rules,
Judge J ertberg considered whether those rules amounted to illegal
restraints (as it were, "of necessity," as the late Chief Justice had
put it). Unlike Chief Justice Stone, Judge Jertberg dealt with the
10s Conclusion of Law
109 That combination

No. 3.
and conspiracy, it must be remembered, was limited, in the
court's view, to the ad~ption and enforcement of the three specific rules discussed in the
text, supra, and did not cover the depository rules in their entirety.
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plan not in its entirety but considered its parts separately. Also
unlike Chief Justice Stone, he in essence upheld a plan which, in
his own opinion, had contained illegal features and opportunities
for abuses.
The relief provided for by Judge J ertberg was limited but consistent with his view of the case. Matters, however, did not rest
there. He inserted a proviso into the judgment whereby the defendants, within one year after entry of that judgment, could
submit to the court a new plan for operation of_ the depository
which, if approved, would cause the court to "modify" the judgment "to permit the operation of a bid depository in accordance
with such plan or modification thereof." No burden was put upon
defendants to show need for such modification. The defendants
were prompt in availing themselves of that privilege. The result
was a "Modified Final Judgment," dated December 22, 1958, by
Judge Yankwich, who had not participated in the trial of the case.
That modified judgment reiterates the conclusion of Judge Jertberg that defendants combined and conspired in violation of the
Sherman Act by adopting and enforcing rules 6, 8 and 12B, and
it reiterates also Judge Jertberg's injunctions against reviving or
continuing those rules, against the requirement of separate bids,
and against price limitations on combined bids. Judge Jertberg's
prohibition against payments of any fees by successful bidders
through the depository has been changed into a prohibition against
such fees if, in the aggregate, they exceed the "amount reasonably
required for the operation and maintenance of such bid depository." [Section IV (a) (iii)]. Instead of Judge Jertberg's outright
prohibition against withdrawals of bids during the interval of time
between opening and submission to general contractors, we now
find injunctions only against coercion and collusion to cause such
withdrawals and against giving or accepting any money for such
withdrawals [Section IV (c) and (d)].
Judge Yankwich added a new section IV-A, requiring that
bid openings by the depository be conducted upon advance notice
to interested general and subcontractors, and that the results be
announced to those who attend the bid opening.
Attached as an exhibit to the Modified Final Judgment is the
defendants' new depository plan which, Judge Yankwich says (in
section IV B): " ... does not violate the antitrust laws of the United
States, provided that the defendants in so operating shall, in all
other respects, be subject to all of the provisions of this judgment."
[Emphasis supplied.] In accordance with the court's injunction,
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rule 6 of this new plan omits the previous requirement for separate
bids on different types of work and the price limitation on combination bids. Taking advantage of the fact that the modified, in
contrast to the original, judgment does not absolutely prohibit fee
payments by successful bidders, the new rule 8 simply cuts those
fees, which had been found to be illegal, from one to one-half percent for each contract, and reduces the maximum fee from $1,000
to $250. Apparently, Judge Yankwich was convinced that such
payments do not exceed "the amount reasonably required for the
operation" of the depository.Judge J ertberg might have considered
this new version of rule 8 contrary to the tenor of his original
judgment. More curiously, rule 12B, which both judgments specify as one of the rules which are conspiratorial and illegal, is
verbatim the same in the new- and in the old plan. There is no
change with respect to withdrawals of bids between opening and
submission to general contractors, and no change in the penalty for
such withdrawals. This rule, condemned though it was and is,
now also is approved by the court, because Judge Yankwich thought
his injunctions against collusive practices in connection therewith
make it harmless.110 The technical workmanship of the final disposition of the Bakersfield case shows similarities to that of a Rube
Goldberg contraption. Uninformed persons reading the approved
rules of the Bakersfield depository may easily overlook the fact that
the court's approval has been limited, or supplemented, by "all of
the provisions in this judgment." Those provisions require that
the opening of the bids be done in public, and they include various
injunctions, especially against collusive use of the rules. They also
include the usual visitation rights for representatives of the Department of Justice, as well as retention of jurisdiction in the court.
Whatever may be said in explanation or defense of the Bakersfield judgments, it is submitted that these criticisms remain:
(1) There is no detailed discussion or evaluation of the restrictive depository rules which the court upheld, no specification
or evaluation of the "evils" which those rules were deemed to combat, much less an explanation of the reasons or weighing processes
by which the court arrived at the conclusion that the remaining
restrictions are preferable to the previous "evils." Since those
unspecified "evils" probably include bid peddling and bid shop-~
ping practices, the unwarranted inference is created that all such
practices are evil, under any circumstances.
110 The Department of Justice, upon hearing on the proposed new rules, objected to
the retention of rule 12B, especially to the continued provision for penalties. It also objected to the retention of fee payments, if at a reduced scale, in new rule 8.
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(2) The trial judge failed to grasp the tying character of the
following provision in rule 6, which has not been vitiated by either
the original or the modified final judgment:
"All bids are to be submitted to the depository upon condition
that either the plumbing, or heating and ventilating, or sheet
metal or electrical portion of any bid may be used by the general contractor with any other plumbing, or heating and
ventilating, or sheet metal or electrical bid or portion of a bid,
submitted through the depository." [Emphasis supplied.] 111
In other words, if a general contractor uses the bid depository for
work on one phase of those mechanical specialties, he must use it
for all work on any of those mechanical specialties. It is difficult
to see why this tying provision, which appears to run counter to
section 3 of the Clayton Act, is necessary to combat the evils of bid
peddling or bid shopping. There is no discussion by the court on
this clause, although it was argued by the Government.
(3) Rule IO of the depository provides that when bids for a
specific project are once opened, there shall be no bidding on that
project for a period of 120 days by contractors who failed to bid
in the first instance (unless the plans and specifications have been
revised in an amount exceeding 25 percent of the work or materials prescribed in the original plans and specifications). The defendants argued that the original bidders, who had gone to considerable expense in preparing their bids, should be protected
against subsequent bidders, even though the awarding authority
may have rejected the general contractor's original bid because the
price was too high. This rule, as the Government pointed out, has
nothing to do with bid peddling. As a renunciation to compete
by those who did not participate in the first bidding, this rule
amounts to an outright agreement in restraint of trade. Its purpose
apparently is to induce subcontractors to participate in the depository procedure, since otherwise they lose their chance on a possible
rebid. The court sustained rule IO, without stating specific reasons.
It is submitted that this rule should have been enjoined because
(a) it is unduly restrictive in itself; (b) it tends to compel members
to bid through the depository; and (c) it is not justified as a measure against unethical bid peddling.
111 This tie-in is further strengthened by rule 11, reading: "All plumbing, heating
and ventilating, sheet metal and electrical bids shall be submitted upon the condition that
the bid may be used only in combination with a plumbing, heating and ventilating, sheet
metal or electrical bid which has been submitted through the depository. Said condition
of bid will be printed upon the bid form provided by the depository."
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(4) The provisions in rule 12B for penalties payable to the
depository in cases of bid withdrawals are not made sufficiently
harmless by Judge Yankwich's injunctions against collusive exercise of the bid withdrawal privilege. Rule 12B clearly tends to
increase prices. For one thing, bidders will be extra careful to
avoid bidding so low as to risk the necessity of withdrawal. For
another thing, even a sound bid might be withdrawn, if the bidder
finds that it is way below his competitors' bids and likely to arouse
their resentment. General business relationships, esprit de corps,
or other considerations may prompt such voluntary withdrawals.
The injunctions of the modified judgment against collusive withdrawals are not applicable to those withdrawals. On the other
hand, complete freedom to withdraw bids may invite frequent
elimination of low bids and even collusive practices, despite the
injunctions. One solution of those seemingly conflicting considerations might be to permit withdrawal only if a bid is based on a
bona fide error. Such error should have to be demonstrated and
explained, perhaps to a special committee. Since, as a practical
matter, the showing of an error could not require elaborate proof
or procedures, a further deterrent in form of moderate penalties
might be provided for. It is not illogical to pay for an error. However, such penalties should be payable not to the depository but to
the awarding authority. The depository suffers no harm by withdrawal of a low bid. Payment to the awarding authority would
partly compensate it for the higher prices of the other subcontractors. That solution would be in the interest of the public, which
bid depositories are supposed to serve.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing analysis, a. number of things are clear. The
typical bid depository arrangements in the building and specialty
contractors' trades are subject to federal jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. Numerous depositories were organized and operated
in the past twenty or more years. Normally, at least one of the purposes of such depositories is the inhibition of so-called bid shopping
and bid peddling. In numerous instances, including all instances
in which the Antitrust Division instituted proceedings, bid depositories had further anticompetitive purposes or effects, at least according to the Antitrust Division's pleadings. Such depository
plans included per se violations of the Sherman Act, e.g., pricefixing and group boycotts. They also included arrangements with
labor or other groups to help enforce the depository rules. When-
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ever depositories organize groups with the aim of foreclosing others
from competing for business, there can be no doubt that they violate the law.
A different problem is represented by depository organizations
which, without directly aiming at the exclusion of competitors
from a market and without otherwise violating the Sherman Act
per se, seek to prevent bid peddling and bid shopping by compulsory restrictions upon their participants. Such compulsory rules
may vary greatly in scope and intensity. They may amount to relatively mild and unimportant encroachments upon freedom in
business conduct; for instance, they may require bid copies to be
filed at a certain place and date, or payments to be made toward
the cost of administration. Anyone entering, free from coercion,
an agreement to do things of that type will hardly be considered to
have restrained trade unreasonably.
Other instances of compulsory rules may attempt to regulate
vital phases in the business conduct of their participants and, by
virtue of their nature and intricacy, amount to something like
regimentation. The more intricate and far-reaching such rules are,
the more likely will they provide also for penalties against infractions. The evaluation of such compulsory arrangements, in the
absence of per se violations, requires that all facts and circumstances of the specific situation be taken into account. However,
since group power and group activities are involved, the borderline of legality as established by Supreme Court precedents surrounds such schemes rather tightly. The Bakersfield plan falls into
this category. With due respect to the eminent judge who wrote
the Modified Final Judgment, it is submitted that the plan which
he approved is unduly restrictive by generally accepted standards
of reasonableness.
The Antitrust Division has taken a stern but not inflexible
position toward depositories, as is apparent from the record. However, it probably will not interpret the Bakersfield judgment to
mean that most any depository arrangement is legal if only it serves
the prevention of bid shopping and bid peddling and shows no
per se illegal restraints. By Judge Yankwich's own reasoning, a
close emulation of the Bakersfield system by other groups would
not necessarily keep such other groups within the boundaries of
the law. For such other groups would not, at the same time, be
subject to injunctions, to inspection by the Department of Justice,
and to a retained jurisdiction in court. Beyond that, different
courts may have different views of what is, and what is not, justified
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in the interest of prevention of bid shopping. While the Bakersfield court heard several witnesses on the "evils" of such practices,
general experience and the abundant testimony from representatives· of divergent interests before numerous committees of Congress make utterly unacceptable the premise that all dealings
which some trade circles call bid shopping or bid peddling necessarily are unethical, undesirable, or superfluous. There is good
evidence that under certain circumstances such dealings are beneficial or even necessary, for instance, in cases of alternate specifi.cations.112 It cannot be gainsaid that bargaining for price reductions
is price competition. Adherents to a depository plan must bear
the burden of showing that it is aimed only at discouraging irresponsible bargaining techniques by reasonable means.
There are other factors which should be taken into account in
any particular situation. One is the size and composition of the
organized group or groups. As the Bakersfield plan illustrates, the
combination of different specialty contractors in one depository
may lead to tying arrangements. Another factor is the past behavior of the parties involved. An established proclivity to wrongdoing is a valid reason for more stringent scrutiny by courts and
law-enforcing agencies. Yet another factor is the nature and
structure of the trade involved. A field in which generally there
is considerable competition will be less restricted by a depository
than a non-competitive field. Small businesses may be less able
than larger ones to bear the possible waste of expenditures on estimates; and the average amount of such expenditures will be greater
in some trades than in other trades. Mechanical specialty contractors may have better over-all reasons for arranging depositories than
many other tradesmen. Among those reasons is the fact that, generally, they comprise relatively small businesses which are faced
with the usually greater power of general contractors.113
Depositories should be accessible to all who want to use them.
No subcontractor or general contractor or owner should be re112 Note that even the Bakersfield plan, in rule 10, appears to leave some elbow-room
for post-bidding negotiati9ns, if only for those who bid on the project in the first instance.
The 120-day freeze on negotiations there provided is binding only upon contractors who
did not so bid. For a discussion of reasons against binding general contractors firmly to
first-round subbids, see Schulz, "The Firm Offer Puzzle," 19 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 237 at 260
(1952).
113 In 1955, the executive vice-president of NECA produced a table listing all mechanical specialty contractors, by lines of business and by states, totalling 87,004. That
table is printed in S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 221-222 (1955). The same witness testified, in 1957, that
there existed more than 15,000 electrical contractors, most of whom do a business of less
than $250,000 per year. He also testified that approximately an average of 40% of total
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quired to deal exclusively through the depository, but the choice
to use it should be open for any given job. Once the path through
the depository has been taken by anyone, he may be bound to
follow the depository procedure to the end of that particular job,
provided that such procedure is not unreasonably restrictive. Fees
adequate for the maintenance of the depository may be collected.
Penalties for infractions payable to the depository should be looked
at askance. Handling of the depository should be left to an agency
independent of the trades involved. Opening of bids should be
public and subject to advance notice to interested parties. Withdrawals of bids between opening and submission to general contractors or owners should be permitted only if the bidder can demonstrate an error in compiling the bid. Stipulations against further
negotiations after the "first-round" bidding should not bind subcontractors who did not participate in such bidding on the particular job at hand. Those who did so participate might be prohibited
from seeking the use of the depository on the same job, for a very
limited time.
The principal sanction on which depositories should rely is
the force of public opinion, i.e., opinion within the trades involved.114 Interested general and subcontractors may be expected
to learn eventually why a particular job was not awarded to the
low bidder through the depository. If the reasons and circumstances of the award to some one else were truly reprehensible and
unethical, the reputation of the offending firms will be damaged.
By the same token, if there were valid reasons for by-passing the
lowest bidder through the depository, ethics and reputations will
not be involved. Since one cannot justly condemn all so-called bid
peddling and bid shopping, that variable regulation by force of
informed opinion appears to be best suited to the problem. The
legitimate purpose o~ such depositories would be frustrated, of
course, if the publication of subbids were used for testing compliance with an illegal scheme for fixing prices, rotating bids, or otherwise violating the law. If anyone suffers discrimination because he
deviated from such a scheme, he should have recourse to law enforcing agencies.
construction costs, at least on federal jobs, are accounted for by costs of mechanical specialty work. H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 3241, etc., 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 25-26 (1957).

114 The executive vice-president of NECA testified in Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d
Cong., 1st sess., p. 28 (1953): "The contractors and subcohtractors involved are subject to
the force of public opinion on private work where the contractor a:qd subcontractor usually
move in the same business circles."

(J't
N)

TABLE OF ANTITRUST CASES ON BID DEPOSITORIES

00

-CASES

Antitrust
Division
Blue Book
Number

CCH or
Federal
Reporter
Citation

.

....
'8'~
0

~~
-~:.I

p..p'.l

U.S. v. Voluntary Code of Heating, Piping and
Air Conditioning Industry of Allegheny County,
Pa. (Clv. No. 698, W.D. Pa. 1939)

468

1932-1939 Trade
Cas, ,T55,253

X

U.S. v, Engineering Survey and Audit Co., Inc,
(Civ. No. 276, Crim, No, 19853, E.D. La. 1940)

470 and
497

1940-1943 Trade
Cas. ,T56,019

X

U.S. v. San Francisco Hardwood Floor Contractors' Assn. (Crim. No. 26824, N.D. Cal. 1939)

473

Not reported

X

U.S. v. Plumbing and Heating Industries Admlnlstrative Assn. (Civ. No. 5226, D.C.D.C.
1939)

476

1932-1939 Trade
Cas. ,T55,256

X

U.S. v. Union Painters Administrative Assn,
(Civ. No. 5225, D,C.D.C. 1939)

477

1932-1939 Trade
Cas. ,T55,257

X

U.S. v, Excavators Administrative Assn, (Clv.
No, 5227, D.C.D.C. 1939)

478

1932-1939 Trade
Cas. ,T55,258

X

U.S. v. Master Plasterers' Assn. of San Francisco
(Crim, No. 26,848-S, N,D, Cal. 1939)

479

3 Trade Reg.
Rep. (8th ed.)
,T15082

X

U.S. v. Heating, Piping and Air Conditioning
Contractors Assn, of Southern California (Civ,
No, 1642-Y, Crim, No. 14250-Y, S.D. Cal, 1940,
1941)

486 and
628

1940-1943 Trade
Cas. ,T56,146;
33 F. Supp, 978

X

U.S. v, Harbor District Chapter, NECA (Clv.
No.1677-RJ, Crim. No.14280-Y,S.D.Cal,1940)

492 and
629

1940-1943 Trade
Cas. ,156, 159

X

U.S. v. Southern California Marble Assn. (Civ.
No. 1254-H, Crim. No. 14279-H, S,D. Cal. 1940)

493 and
567

1940-1943 Trade
Ca~. ,T56,089

X

Involved a Conspiracy in Unreasonable
Restraint of Trade, including:

~~

Ul'J
.. 0

.,

C.

Coercion or
Boycott of

*f.?

Participation

f.?

by Groups of
-., -- -- --- --- g
C.

"
a
(.!)

s
"
-- -- ------

E
0

i

u"

rn

~

. .g.

.. QI

"'E

::a .8

0

,-1

E
0

,!,I

u"

-aC.

-~!l. .
E

rn

u

X

X

QI

~

X

f.?

0

0

QI

~

r.lfoe, A
...
-se~s
s"11::·o1
"
~~l'.:tl 8. .,
&ssA u"
QI

*f.?

"
~:;! (.!)a

Prohibition in
Decree Against
Continuation of
Bid Depository

f.?
C.

"

~
'o
.,
~

X

QI

0

~

ii

]

'§

."'

....E.,

'.::l

IZ"

A

::i

0

C.

QI

--- -- -- -X

X

-- -- -- -- - - ---- -- --- ------ -X
X
X
--

X

--- -- --X

-- ---------X

X

X
X

X

-- --

- - - - --- ----- -- --- -- -----X
X
X
X
- - --- --- -- -- --- -- ---- -X- --X
X
X
--------------------- -X
X
X
X

X

X

X

---

X

X

a:::
....
£....
~

z

i:-<

~

i

X

- - -- --- ----- -- ------ -X- -X
X
X
X
X
---------------------X
X
X
X
X
X
X

r-,

~
(J't

00

U.S. v. Santa Barbara County, Chapter, NECA
(Civ, No, 1678-H, Crim, No, 14286-Y, S.D. Cal,
1940)

499 and
630

1940,1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,153

X

U.S. v. Marble Contractors' Assn. (Clv, No, 805,
W.D. Pa, 1940)

500

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,020

X

U.S. v. Pittsburgh Tile and Mantel Contractors'
Assn, (Clv, No. 806, W.D. Pa. 1940)

501

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,021

X

U.S. v. Mason Contractors' Assn, of the District
of Columbia (Civ. No. 6169, D.C.D,C, 1940)

504

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,015

X

U. S, v. Harbor District Lumber Dealers Assn,
(Civ. No, 1401-Y, Crim, No. 14302-H, S,D.
Cal, 1940)

506 and
590

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,110

X

U. S. v. Empl~ing Plasterers' Assn. of Aliegheny County ( iv. No. 840, W.D. Pa. 1940)

507

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,025

X

U.S. v. Brooker Engineering Co. (Civ. No. 3146,
Crim, No. 25,692, E.D. Mich, 1940, 1942)

508 and
679

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,183

X

U.S. v. Associated Plumbing and Heating Merchants (Crim. No. 45270, W,D, Wash, 1940)

518

38 F. Supp, 769

X

-X- X
X
X
-X- ----- -- -- -X
X

U.S. v. Tile Contractors' Assn. of America, Inc,
(Civ. No. 1761, N.D, Ill. 1940)

533

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,044

X

X

U.S. v. Associated Marble Companies (Civ. No,
21848-L, Crim, No. 26976-L, N.D. Cal, 1940,
1941)

537 and
604

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,136

X

U.S. v, St. Louis Tile Contractors' Assn, (Civ.
No. 521-2, Crim, No. 21552, E.D, Mo, 1940)

543 and
526

3 Trade Reg.
Rep, (8th ed,)
'1!15,096

X

U.S. v. Detroit Tile Contractors' Assn, (Civ.
No. 1962, E.D, Mich. 1940)

545

1940-1943 Trade
Cas, '1!56,053

U.S. v, Northeast Texas Chapter, NECA (Crim,
No. 11952, N.D, Texas 1949)

919

1950-1951 Trade
Cas. 1162,596;
181 F, (2d) 30

X

U.S. v, Reno Merchant Plumbing and Heatln'
Contractors, Inc, (Civ, No. 868, D.C, Nev, 1952

1027

1952-1953 Trade
Cas, '1!67,361

X

U.S. v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Assn.
(Crim, No.12173, Clv, No. 939, D,C, Nev.1951)

1070 and
1080

1955 Trade Cas.
1168,024; 210 F.
(2d) 732, cert.
den, 348 U.S.
817

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

-- -- - - ------------ --X
X
X
X
------ -- --X
X
X
X

------ -----X
X
-X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

,.

X

X

----- - - -- - X
X

X

X

X

-X

X

X

X

X

X

X

,....
f.O
O'l
0

,.__.

X

------ --- --X
X
X
--

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

t:;d

s
---X
-- ----- -- -- -- ti
X
~
0

X

X

c:n

I

---X

- - - - -- --- ------ -X- ------ - X
X
X
-X- ------- -X- X X
X
X
X
(.jt

*Customers signifies general contractors, owners or awarding authorities.

M

f.O

Ct

c.>o
0

TABLE OF ANTITRUST CASES ON BID DEPOSITORIES-Continued
Involved a Conspiracy in Unreasonabl
Restraint of Trade, Including:

CASES

Antitrust
Division
Blue Book
Number

CCHor
Federal
Reporter
Citation

.
0

t,/) t,/)

ia
j,.:
fl

•.::;s
U.S. v. Detroit Sheet Metal and Roofing Contractors Assn., Inc, (Clv. No, 12433, Crim, No,
33452, E,D. Mich. 1955, 1953)

1149 and
1153

1955 Trade Cas,
'1167,986;
1953 Trade Cas.
'1167,596

U.S. v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc, (Civ. No, 1479-N.D, S,D, Cal. 1958)

1242

1958 Trade Cas.
'1169,087 and
1959 Trade Cas,

U.S. v. Arizona Consolidated Masonry and
Plastering Contractors' Assn. (Clv. No. 3066PHX, Crim. No,•C-15290, D,C, Ariz, 1959)

1449 and

J,.~

cJl'l
.. 0

~~

llt

las

p..i:Q

~.s

X

X

.,

"'
8= *~

.,
l'.l

0

.

;:i

~

0

Ei
0
tl

..-1

(.)

V)

0
(.)

.
.g

l!l

l'.l

Ei"'
= "'"'=

"'
8= '&.
l!l
..g ilEi fl'.l
(.)
= "'=
..-1
0

X

V)

X

~ ~'o t

~

=

0

~

X

. I

~u

ai et.s ...
.
~=~·rn =
P..µ1

A

& ;

&.s~A

0
(.)

X

A

al

1;j
t,/)

'.;:!

~

al

:!l

Ji"'.,
.=
i.:
X

--- -- --- --- --- --- --- --X
X
X
X
X

'1169,266

1450

Participation
by Groups of

Coercion or
Boycott of

Prohibition in
Decree Against
Continuation of
Bid Depository

X

-- -------X
X
X

Pending

....~
£....
~

z

1,-4

~

i~
r-,

~
Ct
00

